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This paper presents an integrated macroeconomic approach to monitoring progress toward 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Sub-Saharan Africa. At the heart of our 
approach is a macro model that captures key linkages between foreign aid, public investment 
(disaggregated into education, infrastructure, and health), the supply side, and poverty. The 
model is linked through cross-section regressions to indicators of malnutrition, infant mortality, life 
expectancy, and access to safe water. A composite MDG Indicator is also calculated. The 
functioning of our framework is illustrated by simulating the impact of an increase in aid and a 
debt write-off for Niger at the MDG horizon of 2015, under alternative assumptions about the 
degree of efficiency of public investment. Our approach can serve as the building block of 
Strategy Papers for Human Development (SPAHD), a more encompassing concept than the 
current “Poverty Reduction” Strategy Papers. 
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3,000 Africans die every day of a mosquito bite. Can you think about that, malaria? That's 
not acceptable in the 21st century and we can stop it. And water-borne illnesses--dirty water 
takes another 3,000 lives--children, mothers, sisters… If we're to take this issue seriously, and we 
must, because in 50 years, you know, when they [G-8 Heads of State] look back at this 
moment… they'll talk about what we did or didn't do about this continent bursting into flames. It is 
the most extraordinary thing to watch people dying three in a bed, two on top and one 
underneath, as I have seen in Lilongwe, Malawi. I mean, it is an astonishing thing. And it's 
avoidable. It's an avoidable catastrophe. You saw what happened with the tsunami. You see the 
outpouring, you see the dramatic pictures. Well, there's a tsunami happening every month in 
Africa, but it's an avoidable catastrophe. It is not a natural calamity. 
 




I.  Introduction 
 
In May 1996, development ministers from the member countries of the 
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) issued a report, Shaping the 
21
st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation, in which they 
presented their vision for development progress into the next century. They 
formulated a strategic framework aimed at achieving seven goals set up mainly 
to promote social development and combat widespread poverty in low-income 
countries (LICs). Subsequently, the need to monitor and report on progress 
toward the goals resulted in the establishment of quantified targets for each goal 
and the setting of indicators for measuring progress. The publication of the report 
A Better World for All: Progress toward the International Development Goals in 
June 2000 formally paved the road for a monitoring process of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs).  
 
In September 2000, during the United Nations (U.N.) Millennium Summit, 
the international community adopted the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs 
as strategic indicators by which poor countries and the donor community could 
measure progress toward reducing poverty and improving key dimensions of 
development. LICs were called on to adopt the MDGs in the context of their 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and monitor progress toward meeting 
the goals. In March 2002, at the International Conference on Financing for 
Development in Monterrey, Mexico, the international community established a   4
framework for global partnership between developed and developing countries to 
combat widespread poverty around the world. Later that same year, at the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa, U.N. 
member states reaffirmed their commitment to meeting the MDGs.  
 
However, recent assessments of the status of the MDGs in LICs reveal 
that progress in achieving them has been mixed and slow. In its report published 
in January 2005, the Millennium Project (developed under the auspices of the 
United Nations) noted that although several countries are on track to achieve 
some of the goals, many others are falling way short—particularly so in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The report issued by the Commission for Africa (2005) in March 
2005, and the more recent reviews of progress toward achieving the MDGs by 
the United Nations (2005) and the IMF and the World Bank (2005b), also provide 
a bleak picture for the region. 
 
Several of these recent reports have recognized that growth is a key 
requirement for improving living standards in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
emphasized the need for a “big push” in public investment in education, health 
and infrastructure in order for African countries to meet the MDGs. Many PRSPs 
in the region have recognized the role that infrastructure can play in stimulating 
growth, particularly those aimed at improving productivity and reducing 
production costs in agriculture (see OECD (2004)). The development of 
transportation networks is also viewed as particularly important for the numerous 
landlocked countries in the region to stimulate trade—both domestically and 
internationally. A joint report by the Bretton Woods institutions (see World Bank 
(2005b)) and the Bank’s recent Action Plan for Africa (see World Bank (2005c)) 
called for a doubling of spending on infrastructure (both for “new” investment and 
operation and maintenance) in Sub-Saharan Africa, from 4.7 percent of GDP in 
recent years to more than 9 percent over the next decade, to fill severe gaps in 
the region.
1 To finance this big push, and given the limited ability of most 
                                                 
1How this number is arrived at is, however, not entirely clear.   5
countries in the region to raise domestic resources through taxation or borrowing, 
donors have been called upon to provide massive debt relief and scale up 
considerably their official development assistance.
2 
 
A key issue therefore for LICs is to examine how debt relief and increases 
in aid affect the MDGs, and account for these effects in designing their poverty 
reduction strategies. Understanding these effects, and quantifying them, is also 
important for donors to enhance the quality and depth of the policy debate. 
Indeed, the need to strengthen the quality of technical assistance to countries 
involved in the PRSP process is widely recognized by development institutions 
(see World Bank (2002, 2004, 2005a)) and other observers. Unfortunately, 
current thinking on how to achieve the MDGs has largely failed so far to provide 
a tractable quantitative macroeconomic framework that captures key linkages 
between foreign assistance, the composition of public investment, and the supply 
side (in addition to the “conventional” fiscal and balance-of-payments effects of 
aid).  
 
Partly as a result, most existing exercises for determining requirements for 
meeting the MDGs, carried out in the context of PRSPs, have taken the form of a 
costing exercise of programs to be implemented during the PRSP 
implementation period. This “micro” approach to achieving the MDGs has paid 
insufficient attention to several key aggregate linkages between foreign aid, 
medium-term expenditure frameworks, growth, and the MDGs. Recent evidence 
suggests that such linkages may take the form of large positive externalities (for 
                                                 
2Two papers by Rajan and Subramanian (2005a, 2005b) appear to cast doubt on the 
view that aid may stimulate growth in low-income countries, essentially because of an adverse 
Dutch disease effect. Unfortunately, these studies suffer from several methodological and 
conceptual flaws. For instance, the authors fail to distinguish, in their empirical estimation, 
between fixed and floating exchange rate regimes. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, an aid-
induced nominal appreciation will put downward pressure on the price of imported inputs (a key 
feature of the production structure in developing countries) and thus domestic inflation, thereby 
mitigating the inflationary effect of aid through the demand side. In addition, to the extent that aid 
leads to better infrastructure, it will improve competitiveness in the longer run (by reducing 
production costs), even if the real exchange rate appreciates in the short run. Because the time 
profile of these effects may vary significantly across countries, panel data regressions may 
provide misleading results on the dynamic effects of aid on the real exchange rate.   6
instance, between public investment in health and educational attainment, or 
between capital outlays in infrastructure and literacy), which can be accounted 
for only in a macroeconomic framework.
3 Ignoring these linkages implies that 
“micro” based approaches to MDG costing can be highly inaccurate and lead to 
over-estimation of foreign assistance needs. 
 
This paper builds on the operational macroeconomic model developed by 
Agénor, Bayraktar and El Aynaoui (2005), and extended by Pinto Moreira and 
Bayraktar (2005), to develop a macroeconomic approach to monitoring 
achievement of the MDGs in Sub-Saharan Africa. The model accounts explicitly 
for the links between aid, public investment, and the supply side and provides 
some essential ingredients for understanding key trade-offs in the design of 
poverty reduction strategies.
4 Specifically, we embed the model into a broader 
framework that incorporates cross-country regressions for Sub-Saharan African 
countries. This approach allows us to link directly policy and endogenous 
variables (such as public spending on health or income per capita) to the MDGs. 
Although we cannot account for all the MDGs in this setup (such as maternal 
mortality, or the plight of the poor living in city slums), we do explain the behavior 
of several important indicators—including the poverty rate, malnutrition, the infant 
mortality rate, percentage of population with access to safe drinking water, the 
literacy rate, and life expectancy at birth.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes 
the methodology. Section III presents the baseline scenario for the country that 
we use to illustrate the functioning of our framework, Niger. Section IV discusses 
the effects of two policy experiments on the MDGs, an increase in foreign aid 
                                                 
3In a comprehensive review of the PRS approach, the German Development Cooperation 
(2005) identified the need to enhance linkages and consistency between the PRS, the medium-
term expenditure framework, and government budgets as one of the key priorities for enhancing 
the effectiveness of the approach. A similar emphasis was placed by the World Bank (2005) in its 
five-point agenda for accelerating progress toward the MDGs. 
4The emphasis on public investment and the supply side in these models dwells on the 
more advanced class of IMMPA models, described in the collection of studies edited by Agénor, 
Izquierdo, and Jensen (2005).    7
(namely, grants) and debt relief, under the assumption that public investment is 
fully efficient, in the sense that it translates one to one into a higher stock of 
public capital. Section V examines the same policy experiments in the alternative 
case where public investment is only half as inefficient. Section VI provides some 
final remarks.  
 
 
II.  Methodology 
 
At the heart of our framework is the macroeconomic model developed by 
Agénor, Bayraktar, and El Aynaoui (2005) and extended by Pinto Moreira and 
Bayraktar (2005). The model captures the links between foreign aid, the level 
and composition of public investment, the supply-side effects of public capital, 
growth, and poverty, in the context of a “typical” low-income country. It focuses 
on the fiscal and supply-side effects of aid, as well as the stock and flow effects 
of public investment---which is disaggregated into education, infrastructure 
(roads, electricity, telecommunications, and so on), and health---while accounting 
at the same time for potential congestion effects associated with the use of public 
services. It is designed to examine how debt relief, as well as increased aid and 
aid-funded levels of public investment, possibly coupled with changes in the 
allocation of public expenditure, can stimulate growth and lead to sustained 
poverty reduction.   
 
Because it contains only one category of households, the model is silent 
on distributional issues. However, this is very much by design; the fundamental 
premise of our approach is that the ability to engage in substantial income or 
asset redistribution in Sub-Saharan Africa is limited for a variety of reasons   8
(including the low level of income to begin with), and that the key to achieving the 
MDGs is a sustained increase in growth rates.
5 
 
The first part of this section describes the macro model and how it is 
related to poverty. The second part explains how macroeconomic variables 
(namely, income and consumption per capita), as well as poverty, are linked with 
the other MDG indicators. 
 
1.  The Macro Model 
 
We begin by describing the production side, which is summarized in 
Figure 1. The economy produces one composite good, which is imperfectly 
substitutable to an imported good. Domestic production requires effective labor, 
private capital, and public capital in infrastructure and health.
 The stock of private 
capital is calculated by applying the standard perpetual inventory method. In the 
case of public investment, however, we account for the possibility that a fraction 
of the resources invested in investment projects may not have a positive impact 
on the public capital stock—a point emphasized by Prichett (1996) in the context 
of developing countries in general. Specifically, we follow the linear specification 
proposed by Arestoff and Hurlin (2005) and relate the stock of public capital in 
sector h at period t, denoted K
h(t), to the flow of investment in h, denoted IG
h, 
through the modified formula 
 
K
h(t) = (1 - δ
h)K
h(t-1) + αIG
h(t-1),                                                               (1) 
 
where δ
h ∈ (0,1) denotes the rate of depreciation of capital h and α ∈ (0,1) is the 
efficiency parameter. The case of “full efficiency” corresponds therefore to α = 1. 
In the experiments reported below, we will also consider the case α < 1. 
                                                 
5Moreover, many observers have failed to note that redistribution may actually hurt the 
poor—by reducing savings and investment rates, or the ability to pledge collateral for borrowing 
against future income, for instance. See Agénor (2005c) for a more detailed discussion.   9
 
While public capital in infrastructure improves the productivity of the 
private factors used to generate output, public capital in health improves the 
quality of labor employed in production. Effective labor is a composite input, 
which is produced by the actual stock of educated labor and public capital in 
health. In order to take into account congestion effects in the provision of health 
services, the stock of public capital in health is scaled by the size of the 
population. To account for congestion effects in domestic production, lagged 
output is used as an indicator of the intensity of use of public services in 
infrastructure. Domestic output is allocated between exports and domestic sales. 
 
Population and “raw” labor grow at the same constant exogenous rate. 
The transformation of raw labor into educated labor takes place through the 
education system, which provides schooling services free of charge. A key input 
in this process is a composite public education input, which is a function of the 
number of teachers and the stock of public capital in education. But production of 
educated labor requires not only teachers and public capital in education but also 
access to infrastructure capital. This is a crucial feature of the model. As 
documented by Brenneman and Kerf (2002), many recent microeconomic 
studies have found a positive impact of infrastructure services on educational 
attainment, possibly through an indirect improvement in health indicators. A 
better transportation system and a safer road network (particularly in rural areas) 
help to raise school attendance. Greater access to safe water and sanitation 
enhance the health of individuals, increasing their ability to learn. Electricity 
allows more time to study and more opportunities to use electronic equipment 
that may improve the learning process. As far as we know, our model is the first 
to account for these effects in a quantitative macroeconomic framework.
6 This 
adds an important channel of transmission of public investment to growth, 
through human capital accumulation. 
                                                 
6See Agénor (2005c, 2005d) for a formal analysis of the implications of this specification 
in endogenous growth models. As discussed by Agénor (2005f), infrastructure may also have a 
significant impact on the production of health services.    10
Figure 1 
















A congestion effect is introduced in the stock of public capital in education 
through raw labor, which captures pressure on the education system. Educated 
labor is employed either in the production of goods, or as government 
employees.  
 
Income from production is entirely allocated to a representative household, 
who holds the totality of domestic public debt and receives interest payments on 
it. It also receives government wages and salaries, unrequited transfers from 
abroad, and pays interest on its foreign debt. Disposable income is obtained by 
subtracting direct taxes from total income. Total private consumption is a 
constant fraction of disposable income—an assumption that reflects the large 
body of evidence for low-income countries suggesting either tight liquidity 
constraints or short planning horizons (see Agénor (2004, Chapter 2)).  
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Private investment is a function of the rate of growth in domestic output, 
private foreign capital inflows, and the stock of public capital in infrastructure. The 
latter variable captures the existence of a “complementarity” effect—by 
increasing the productivity of private inputs, or by reducing adjustment costs, a 
higher stock of public capital in infrastructure raises the rate of return on capital 
and leads to an increase in private investment.
7  
 
Total demand for goods sold on the domestic market is the sum of private 
and public spending on final consumption and investment. Goods bought and 
sold on the domestic market are the combination of imported goods and 
domestically-produced goods. The domestic good is imperfectly substitutable 
with the foreign good, and its relative price is endogenous. As a result, the model 
allows us to analyze potential Dutch disease effects that may be associated with 
large aid flows in a fixed-exchange rate economy such as Niger through 
increases in domestic prices. 
 
Aid, defined only as grants, is linked to the government budget through 
various channels (see Figures 2 and 3). The government collects taxes and 
spends on salaries, goods and services, interest payments, and accumulates 
public capital. Aid is accounted for “above the line”; it is therefore a potential 
substitute to domestic sources of revenue. The deficit is financed through 
domestic borrowing and foreign borrowing (concessional or not). Taxes are 
defined as the sum of direct, domestic indirect, and international (import) taxes. 
Total public investment is allocated (using fixed fractions) between health, 
education, and infrastructure. The effective direct tax rate is negatively related to 
the aid-to-GDP ratio, and positively to total government expenditure. Aid captures 
therefore an adverse effect of foreign assistance on fiscal effort. The effective 
indirect tax rate is also negatively related to aid. Current non-interest expenditure 
on goods and services is assumed to be constant as a proportion of GDP.  
                                                 
7See Agénor, Nabli and Yousef (2005) for a detailed discussion of these effects and a 
review of the empirical evidence for developing countries.   12
Figure 2 



















Total public investment is positively related to both tax revenue (a 
measure of the capacity to raise domestic resources) and foreign aid. To account 
explicitly for the implications of a higher capital on stock on recurrent spending 
(and thus financing needs), maintenance expenditure is related to depreciation of 
all stocks of public capital.
8  Accounting for “required” maintenance outlays as we 
do is important; inadequate funding for maintenance has been a chronic problem 
                                                 
8We do not account here for “feedback” effects of maintenance expenditure, most notably 
on the rate of depreciation of the public capital stock, as well as possibly on the durability of 
private capital (all depreciation rates are assumed constant). The key idea in the latter case is 
that maintaining the quality of roads, for instance, enhances the durability of trucks and other 
means of transportation used by the private sector to move labor and goods. Similarly, with a 
more reliable power grid, electrical equipment may last longer. See Agénor (2005e) for a formal 



















in many developing countries, resulting in rapid decay of public capital, such as 
























The financing constraint of the government implies that the budget 
balance is financed through domestic and foreign borrowing. From the household 
budget constraint, private savings is determined by a constant saving rate and 
disposable income. 
 
The balance of payments is obtained by subtracting foreign interest 
payments and changes in net foreign assets of the central bank from the sum of 


























abroad. The stocks of private and public foreign debt are obtained by adding the 
current period capital flow to the debt level of the previous period.  
 
The price of the composite good is a function of the price of the 
domestically-produced good and the domestic-currency price of imports (defined 
as the product of the nominal exchange rate and the world price of imports, 
inclusive of tariffs). Market equilibrium requires equality between total supply of 
goods on the domestic market and aggregate demand for these goods, which in 
turn determines the equilibrium (composite) price. The price of the domestic good 
on the domestic market, however, is assumed to adjust only gradually to its 
equilibrium value. Finally, the domestic-currency price of exports is equal to the 
exchange rate times the world price of exports. 
 
2.  Link with the MDGs 
 
 
Our approach to monitoring the MDGs is summarized in Figure 4. Six of 
the MDG indicators are integrated: the poverty rate, the literacy rate, infant 
mortality, malnutrition, life expectancy, and access to safe water. A key feature of 
our approach is that the MDG indicators also interact with each other, in a way 
that is made precise through our cross-country regressions. 
 
  The poverty rate is linked directly to the macroeconomic model. 
Specifically, the model is linked to poverty through either partial growth 
elasticities relating a poverty indicator to consumption, or a household survey.  
The first method consists of relating the poverty rate (as measured by the 
headcount index) to the growth rate of real private consumption per capita, as 
derived from the model. In the absence of more precise country estimates (as in 
the case of Niger discussed later), we use three partial elasticity values: a 
“neutral” or central value of -1, a “low” value of -0.5, and a “high” value of -1.5. 
These values are consistent with the range of evidence on the “growth elasticity” 
of poverty for Sub-Saharan Africa and can, of course, be changed. For instance,   15
the value -0.5 is close to the estimate obtained by Besley and Burgess (2003, 
Table 2) for Sub-Saharan Africa, and by Christiansen, Demery, and Paternostro 
(2003, Table 4) for Ethiopia and Zambia. In addition, we also use the “adjusted” 
elasticity formula proposed by Ravallion (2004, pp. 12-13). With a Gini coefficient 
equal to 50.5 for Niger, the formula gives an elasticity of -1.13. 
 
Figure 4 




























The second methodology, which involves linking the model to a household 
survey, involves several steps and is summarized in Figure 5. First, using a 
representative income and expenditure survey, the value of consumption 
spending for each household is extracted, and given the poverty line, the initial 
poverty rate is calculated. Second, following a policy or exogenous shock, the 
growth rate in private consumption per capita is generated in the macroeconomic 























on infrastructure  16
rate is applied to the consumption expenditure data for each household in the 
survey. This gives new consumption levels for each unit, for periods 1,...N. 
Fourth, the poverty line is updated by using the growth rate of the consumer price 
index generated by the macroeconomic model. Finally, using the new data on 
nominal consumption per household and the poverty line, “post-shock” poverty 
indicators are calculated and compared with initial indicators to assess the 
























The literacy rate, which is defined as the ratio of educated labor to total 
population, is also a direct output of the model. It is only an approximation to the 
conventional definition, which related to the proportion of the population aged 15 
years and over which is literate.  
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All other MDG indicators (malnutrition, infant mortality, life expectancy, 
and access to safe water) are linked to the model through cross-country 
regressions, which allow us to alleviate the lack of observations at the level of 
individual countries. We use a cross-section estimation technique, in order to 
focus on long-run relationships. Given that all the MDG indicators considered 
here tend to change slowly over time, this appears to be a more sensible strategy 
than using, say, dynamic panel techniques. These regressions are discussed in 
some detail in the Appendix.   
 
Malnutrition prevalence is linked to the model through real consumption 
per capita, the poverty rate, and public spending on health.
9 While increasing 
consumption per capita and public spending on health reduces the incidence of 
malnutrition, an increase in the poverty rate raises it. Infant mortality is inversely 
related to poverty, and positively related to real income per capita and public 
spending on health.
10 Thus, declining poverty may not be sufficient to decrease 
infant mortality if public investment in health is not increasing sufficiently.
11  
  
Public spending on health also has a positive effect on life expectancy, 
which can be viewed as a “summary” indicator of the goal of combating diseases. 
Besides public investment in health, lower poverty rates and higher real income 
per capita also tend to increase life expectancy. Our evidence on the impact of 
                                                 
9See Broca and Stamoulis (2003) for a more general discussion of the micro- and macro-
determinants of malnutrition. Our results are consistent with those of Smith and Haddad (1999), 
who used data from 63 countries in five regions (covering 88 percent of the developing world’s 
population over the period from 1970-95) to analyze the determinants of child malnutrition, as 
measured by the percentage of underweight children under five. They found that growth in per 
capita national income (which is closely correlated with consumption per capita) contributed to 
half the reduction in child malnutrition over this period. 
10In general, one would expect infant mortality to be also determined by malnutrition 
prevalence. We did not, however, introduce this link because we could not find empirical support 
for it in our cross-country regressions. 
11Another important effect of increasing public spending on health (as noted earlier) is 
that it raises effective labor, which improves efficiency, thus economic growth. Note that, due to 
lack of data, our regressions use “flows” rather than “stocks” of public expenditure.   18
income is consistent with the results obtained by Baliamoune and Lutz (2004) in 
a larger sample of countries.
12  
 
The share of population with access to safe water is taken to be a function 
of population density, real income per capita, and public spending on 
infrastructure. The effect of population density on access to safe water is positive 
because the cost of building infrastructure capital tends to drop with higher 
density. Similarly, increasing real income per capita raises the share of 
population with access to safe water, possibly as a result of “demand” pressures. 
And naturally enough, public investment in infrastructure raises access to safe 
water—both directly and possibly indirectly as well, through its impact (captured 
in the model) on real income per capita. 
 
To provide a synthetic view on progress toward achieving the MDGs, we 
also calculate a composite index by taking an unweighted geometric average of 
all the individual indicators defined earlier—the literacy rate, life expectancy, 
access to safe water, as well as the inverse of the poverty rate (as obtained in 
the “neutral elasticity” case), malnutrition prevalence, and infant mortality. Thus, 
a rise in the index indicates overall progress toward achieving the MDGs.  Our 
composite index is thus more general than the human development index 
published in recent years by the United Nations Development Program in its 
Human Development Report, which is an unweighted arithmetic average of the 







                                                 
12One would also expect life expectancy to be affected by malnutrition prevalence, but 
our empirical findings did not support this link. 
13See Chakravarty (2003) for a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of this index.   19
III.  Baseline Projections 
 
  To illustrate the functioning of the framework described in the previous 
section, we apply it to Niger. With 63 percent of the population living below the 
poverty line, and 34 percent considered as extremely poor, Niger is the second 
poorest country on earth.
14 Despite recent improvements, social indicators 
remain abysmal, and among the weakest in the world (see Table 1). Child 
malnutrition is high and estimated at 40 percent, compared with an average of 26 
percent in Sub-Saharan Africa. The infant mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 births) 
is currently 155, whereas it averages 96 for the continent as a whole. Less than 
60 percent of the population has access to potable water and only 5 percent of 
the rural population has access to sanitation facilities. Life expectancy at birth is 
about 46 years, compared with an average of 48 years in Sub-Saharan Africa. At 
17 percent, the literacy rate is among the lowest in the world and far below the 
average for the region, estimated at 60 percent.  
 
We first established a baseline projection using the macro framework 
described earlier, based on assumptions that reflect recent trends regarding aid, 
prices of exports and imports, capital flows, and so on.
15  In particular, the aid-to-
GDP ratio is assumed to remain constant at 10.7 percent until 2015, and foreign-
currency prices of exports and imports are assumed to grow at the same rate, so 
that we exclude net gains in the terms of trade. Domestic borrowing is kept at 1 
percent of GDP (the value observed in the base period) and tax rates that are 
exogenous are also kept constant. 
 
                                                 
14The United Nations Development Program, using its Human Development Index, 
ranked Niger 176 out of 177 countries in 2004. 
15The complete set of simulation results, and details about the calibration process, are 
available upon request.   20
1990 2002 1990 2002
Poverty rate
(% of the population living below $2 per day) 63 63.0 44.7 55.5
(in 1993) (in 2003)
Literacy rate 11.4 17.1 48.5 60.3
(% of educated labor in total population)
Infant mortality 191 155.0 104.2 96.3
(Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births)
Malnutrition 42.6 40.1 27.8 26.3
(Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age) (in 1992) (in 2000)
Life expectancy 42.1 46.2 50.6 48.2
(Life expectancy at birth, years )
Access to safe water 53.0 59.0 59.1 60.5
(Percentage of population with access to safe water) (in 2000)
Note: Sub-Saharan countries exclude South Africa and oil-exporting countries.
Table 1
Niger Sub-Saharan Africa
Niger: MDG Indicators, 1990 and 2002
 
 
Most importantly, we assume for the moment that public investment is 
“fully efficient”, in the sense that it translates CFA franc for CFA franc into an 
increase in the public capital stock. This corresponds to the case where α = 1 in 
equation (1). Thus, we assume that in the coming years Niger will continue to 
implement institutional reforms that will help to improve governance, strengthen 
management of public resources, reduce corruption, and eliminate much of the 
waste that all too often characterized capital outlays in the past. 
 
Baseline projections are shown in Table 2 for the period 2005-15.  The 
results show that poverty drops throughout the simulation period. As shown in 
Table 2, the headcount index decreases in the “best” case (a consumption 
growth elasticity of -1.5) by 25.1 percentage points, down to 37.9 percent in   21
2015, from an estimated 63 percent in 2003. However, in the Besley-Burgess 
case (a consumption growth elasticity of -0.5), the poverty rate drops by 10.9 
percentage points only, over the same period. Thus if current trends were to be 
maintained, the MDG of halving poverty would not be achieved by 2015. Indeed, 
in these circumstances, relative to 2003, it would take 15 years (or a target date 
of 2018) in the high elasticity case, or 39 years (or a target date of 2042) in the 
Besley-Burgess case, for Niger to reduce its poverty rate in half. 
 
Regarding the other MDG indicators reported in Table 2, the literacy rate 
(defined as the ratio of educated labor to total population) increases from 17.1 
percent in 2003 to 27.6 in 2015, as a result of an increase in public investment in 
education and infrastructure combined with an increasing number of teachers. 
Whereas infant mortality drops from 155 in 2002 to 119 in 2015, malnutrition 
prevalence drops only slightly from 40.1 percent in 2000 to 36.8 percent in 2015. 
These improvements are a result of a combination of factors--reduction in 
poverty, increased public investment in health, and higher GDP and private 
consumption per capita.
16 For similar reasons, life expectancy also increases, 
from 46.2 in 2002 to 49.1 in 2015.  
 
The last individual indicator, the percentage of population with access to 
safe water, rises from 59 percent in 2000 to 61.4 percent in 2015 as a result of 
increasing public investment in infrastructure, and higher GDP per capita and 
population density, all of which are estimated to have a positive effect on access 
to safe water. In sum, the MDG indicators improve quite sensibly in Niger; the 
composite MDG index (which is defined as a geometric average with base 2005 
= 100 for convenience) shows a significant overall improvement, increasing by 23 
percentage points. But again, despite these improvements, Niger will not be able 
to achieve the MDG targets by 2015 based on recent trends. In particular, 
halving poverty and malnutrition by 2015 will require more effort.  
                                                 
16The elasticity used to link poverty and the MDGs corresponds to the “neutral” case of 
unity. Adjusting this parameter is of course straightforward.   22
IV.  Policy Experiments 
 
Given that our baseline scenario suggests that achieving the MDGs is 
unfeasible based on current trends, we consider two experiments: the first is a 
permanent increase in the ratio of foreign aid to GDP by 5 percentage points, 
whereas the second is a complete write-off of the outstanding stock of foreign 
debt. Both shocks are assumed to occur in 2006. Again, given the illustrative 
nature of the exercise, we provide only a concise description of the transmission 
channels.
17 We also focus our discussion on a comparison between 2005 and 
2015, although a comparison between 1990 and 2015 would be more in line with 
a strict assessment of progress toward achieving the MDGs. 
 
1.  Increase in Foreign Aid 
 
The immediate macroeconomic effect of an increase in aid is an increase 
in aggregate demand. This, in turn, puts upward pressure on domestic prices. 
Given that the nominal exchange rate is fixed, the real exchange rate 
appreciates, which tends to dampen exports (and to raise sales of the 
domestically-produced good on the domestic market) and increase imports. The 
magnitude of these effects is, however, dampened by the fact that prices adjust 
only partially in the short run, whereas the reallocation of output, as well as the 
composition of demand, changes only gradually.  Put differently, there is indeed 
a “Dutch disease” effect, but its magnitude is not large. 
 
Moreover, this effect is mitigated over time. The increase in foreign aid 
leads to an increase in public investment. Because the shares of each 
component of public investment are fixed at baseline levels (and are thus 
constant throughout the simulation period), all components of public investment 
increase. This results in an increase in the stock of capital in education and 
                                                 
17More details on these experiments are provided in Agénor, Bayraktar and El Aynaoui 
(2005) and Pinto Moreira and Bayraktar (2005).   23
infrastructure, and the “public education input,” which therefore leads to the 
production of a higher number of educated workers. This increase, combined 
with the rise in the stock of public capital in health, leads to greater availability of 
“effective” labor. This supply-side effect develops gradually, raising private 
spending and consumption, and dampening the initial inflationary effect of the 
increase in aid. This effect is, in a sense, self-reinforcing: because tax revenues 
increase also over time (despite an adverse “moral hazard” effect of aid on 
collection effort), there is an additional positive effect on public investment. 
Indeed, although the increase in aid tends to reduce incentives to collect taxes 
(thereby leading to lower “effective” tax rates on both income an domestic sales), 
the tax base tends to increase, as a result of higher domestic income and the rise 
in imports induced by the real appreciation. The net effect is that overall tax 
revenues tend to increase, thereby raising capital outlays. An important 
implication of this result is that an aid-induced reduction in (indirect) taxation may 
be beneficial to the poor in the short term—to the extent that it mitigates upward 
pressure on prices of goods sold domestically—but in the longer term, it may hurt 
them, by reducing the capacity to finance public investment and mitigating 
supply-side effects. 
 
The effects of this experiment on the MDGs are shown in Table 3. The 
headcount index based on a partial elasticity of -1.5 falls by 38 percentage 
points, from an estimated 66.9 percent in 2005 to 28.9 by 2015. However, with 
an elasticity of -0.5, the drop is 15.3 percentage points, and poverty is estimated 
at 49 percent in 2015. Thus in the high elasticity case of -1.5, and full efficiency 
of public investment, the simulation suggests that a 5 percentage-point increase 
in aid leads to a reduction in poverty by half between 2005 and 2015. But the 
simulation also suggests that foreign aid may need to be increased by more than 
10 percentage points of GDP in the Besley-Burgess case of a consumption 
growth elasticity of -0.5 even if public capital outlays are fully efficient.  Given the 
baseline assumptions, this would bring the aid-to-GDP ratio to almost 22 percent.   24
Whether, at that level, absorption constraints may “kick in” and become binding is 
an open issue. 
 
Because, as noted earlier, the increase in public capital in education and 
infrastructure leads to the production of a higher number of educated workers, 
the literacy rate increases by 3.7 percentage points, from an estimated 19.2 
percent in 2005 to 31.3 percent by 2015. The incidence of child malnutrition also 
falls, both directly and indirectly. The increase in Government resources 
associated with a rise in aid increases public investment and capital in health, 
whereas the increase in real private consumption per capita tends to reduce 
poverty; both effects tend to reduce malnutrition. Given the estimated 
parameters, the net effect is a drop in this indicator, by 8.9 percentage points by 
2015 (from 41.1 percent to 32.2 percent). 
 
The reduction in poverty and the rise in public capital in health are 
associated with a reduction in infant mortality, which falls from an estimated 156 
per 1000 live births in 2005 to 102 in 2015. Thus, the simulation results suggest 
that reducing the under-five mortality rate by two-thirds could be achieved in 
Niger through the increase in aid considered here. Life expectancy also 
improves, from an estimated 46.4 years in 2005 to 51.7 years in 2015. Increasing 
real income per capita, as well as public capital in infrastructure, leads to an 
increase in access to safe water, from 57.5 percent in 2005 to 62.7 percent in 
2015. Overall, by 2015 the composite MDG index improves by about 14.4 
percentage points relative to the baseline scenario. 
 
2.  Cancellation of External Debt 
 
Following recent decisions by G-8 countries, debt cancellation is at the 
forefront of the policy agenda for many LICs. For this experiment, we assume 
that the outstanding stock of Niger’s external debt is cancelled in 2006, and that 
in the following years “new” borrowing occurs only at a very low effective interest   25
rate, of 0.2 percent.
18 We assume that the savings associated with lower interest 
payments (which represent about 0.52 percent of GDP in 2006) are reallocated 
entirely to public investment. 
 
On impact, debt relief has no effect on the budget and aggregate demand. 
Over time, because public investment increases, public capital in infrastructure, 
education and health also increase, generating positive supply-side effects. As 
described above, these effects tend to strengthen over time. At the MDG horizon, 
however, gains are relatively limited, given the magnitude of the savings realized; 
by 2015, the growth rate in per capita output at factor cost is only about 0.2 
percentage points higher than the baseline value. 
 
Results of this experiment on the MDGs are shown in Table 4. The 
direction of the effects on all indicators is similar to those associated with an 
increase in aid—poverty falls, literacy and access to safe water improves, and 
malnutrition and infant mortality drop. But, given the magnitude of the shock, by 
2015, the composite MDG indicator improves by less than 2 percentage points 
relative to the baseline scenario. 
 
An interesting question is whether the impact of debt relief compares 
favorably with a permanent increase in aid of the exact same magnitude, of 
about 0.52 percentage of GDP, beginning also in 2006. The results (which are 
not reported here to save space) show that an increase in aid has a slightly 
larger impact; the composite MDG indicator improves by 1.7 at the horizon 2015 
(compared to 1.6 for the debt relief experiment). The reason is that the increase 
in aid has a slightly bigger effect on aggregate demand, because (as noted 
earlier) it lowers incentives to collect taxes; the reduction in the effective direct 
tax rate leads to an increase in private disposable income and spending. In turn, 
the increase in spending puts upward pressure on prices.  The real exchange 
                                                 
18An alternative “closure rule” for the budget would be to assume that the deficit is 
financed by additional grants. However, doing so in the present context would mix the effects of 
debt relief with those of additional aid, and blur differences in the transmission mechanism.   26
rate therefore appreciates more, and imports increase by more, than in the debt 
relief case. As a result, tariff revenues increase by more. The overall effect on 
total revenues is positive—despite the fact that the moral hazard effects of aid 
lead to slightly lower revenues collected on domestic sales and private income. 
Because public investment depends also on domestic resources, higher tax 
revenues magnify the positive effect of the initial increase in foreign aid on public 
capital accumulation.   
 
A key reason why the debt relief experiment does not deliver stronger 
results (despite the assumption that all interest savings are allocated to public 
investment) is not only due to the magnitude of the shock but also to the fact that 
the macro model on which the analysis is based does not account for the 
possibility of a reverse “debt overhang” effect. In the presence of a debt 
overhang problem, a reduction in foreign debt, by reducing the perceived risk of 
taxation or confiscation, would stimulate private investment (above and beyond 
the complementarity effect discussed earlier), thereby magnifying supply-side 
effects. But although there is evidence in favor of such an effect for low-income 
countries in general (as discussed by Agénor (2004, Chapter 2)), we did not find 
strong evidence in favor of it in the specific case of Niger. The policy implication, 
of course, is that debt relief must be accompanied by a large and sustained 
increase in aid if Niger is to reach the MDGs. 
 
 
V.  Inefficient Public Investment 
 
The foregoing analysis assumed that public investment is fully efficient, in 
the sense that all capital outlays in education, infrastructure, and health serve to 
increase one to one the public capital stock. We now briefly consider the case 
where inefficiency persists, or that reforms aimed at improving governance and 
eliminate mismanagement of public resources are not sufficiently deep. Because 
we do not have specific estimates of the parameter α in equation (1) for Niger,   27
we chose a value of 0.5 for all categories of public capital. This is consistent with 
Pritchett’s (1996) estimate that half of all capital outlays are wasted in developing 
countries. It also corresponds to the mid-point of the range of values—between 
0.4 and 0.6—estimated by Arestoff and Hurlin (2005). 
 
The baseline scenario, as well as the results of the two experiments 
described in the previous section, are summarized in Tables 5 to 7.  The key 
implication is that, in the absence of appropriate reforms aimed at improving the 
management of capital outlays, progress toward all the MDG indicators will be 
hampered. In particular, in the baseline scenario, the composite indicator will 
improve by only 13.4 percentage points between 2005 and 2015 (compared to 
23 in the full efficiency case); and even in the high elasticity case, the poverty 
rate will fall only from 66.9 in 2005 to 47.7 (instead of 37.9). To halve the poverty 
rate relative to 2003, it would take now 25 years (or a target date of 2028) in the 
high elasticity case, and 69 years (or a target date of 2072) in the Besley-
Burgess case. A 5-percentage point increase in the aid-to-GDP ratio would lead 
to an improvement in the composite MDG indicator of 10.5 percentage points by 
2015 relative to the baseline (instead of 15.1), whereas a debt write-off would 
lead to an improvement of 1.2 at the same horizon (compared to 1.6). To achieve 
the poverty MDG in 2015, the aid-to-GDP ratio would need therefore to increase 
to 26.6 percent in the Besley-Burgess case—exacerbating therefore the potential 
problems of absorption capacity that were discussed earlier. 
 
To the extent that a coefficient of α = 0.5 is an adequate estimate for Niger 
in the coming years, the lesson from this alternative set of experiments is clear—
without adequate reforms to strengthen the management of public resources and 
eliminate waste, the benefits that an increase in foreign aid or a debt write-off can 
bring in terms of the MDGs can be significantly hampered. In that sense, our 
results accord well with the view adopted by some that governance (defined 
broadly to include the efficient management of public funds) must improve to 
make aid effective.   28
VI.  Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper was to present an integrated macroeconomic 
approach to monitoring progress toward achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) in Sub-Saharan Africa. At the heart of our approach is the macro 
model developed by Agénor, Bayraktar and El Aynaoui (2005) and extended by 
Pinto Moreira and Bayraktar (2005). A detailed presentation was provided in the 
first part of the paper. A key feature of the model is a production function that 
accounts explicitly for the effect of public capital (in health and infrastructure) on 
output and the marginal productivity of private production inputs. Public capital in 
education also plays a role in the production process, because “raw” labor must 
be turned into educated labor to become productive. The domestic (composite) 
good is imperfectly substitutable with the foreign good. By accounting for 
changes in relative prices, potential Dutch disease effects associated with aid 
flows can therefore be analyzed. In addition, the model captures explicitly the link 
between aid and public investment, and the possible adverse effects of large 
inflows of foreign aid on fiscal accounts (most notably the incentive to collect 
taxes and pressure on current spending). Finally, the impact of policy shocks on 
poverty is assessed either by linking the model to a household survey or by using 
partial elasticities relating consumption growth to poverty, using a range of 
available estimates for low-income countries. 
 
By linking the model through cross-country regressions to indicators of 
malnutrition, infant mortality, life expectancy, and access to safe water, we 
provided a consistent framework for evaluating the impact of policy decisions on 
the MDGs. The functioning of our framework was illustrated by simulating the 
impact of a 5-percentage point increase in the share of foreign aid in GDP and 
debt cancellation in Niger for the period 2006-15. We conducted the two 
experiments under two alternative assumptions regarding the degree of 
efficiency of public investment: full efficiency, in which all investment outlays 
serve to increase the capital stock, and partial efficiency, where only half of every   29
currency unit spent helps to raise the stock of public capital. Overall, our results 
showed that a debt write-off, while welcome for a low-income country like Niger, 
will be insufficient to allow the country to reach the MDGs; an increase in aid is 
essential in that regard. At the same time, however, the magnitude of the 
required increase, if the elasticity of poverty with respect to consumption growth 
is relatively low (as suggested by Besley and Burgess (2003)) and if public 
investment is relatively inefficient, may well be unfeasible due to absorption 
constraints. In such conditions, a gradual and sustained increase in foreign 
assistance may be preferable. 
 
The analysis presented in this paper can be extended in various 
directions.  It would be important, for instance, to account for the impact of health 
on educational attainment—and thus indirectly on growth, poverty, and other 
social indicators. A growing body of evidence (aptly documented by Bundy and 
others (2005)) has shown that health is an important factor in determining both 
the quantity and quality of human capital. Healthier children tend to do better in 
school, just like healthier workers perform their tasks better (as captured in our 
macro model). Accounting for these effects in a macroeconomic context may be 
quite challenging, due to the difficulty of estimating reliable parameters with 
limited data, but would be well worth the effort. 
 
Another issue worth investigating is the possibility of “reverse linkages” 
between the MDGs and the macro model. At the moment, the only feedback 
effect is from the literacy rate to the supply side. But several other channels could 
be envisioned. For instance, as indicated by a dotted line in Figure 4, a high 
poverty rate could lower the propensity to save and invest, along the lines of the 
“vicious circle” described by Nurkse (1953). Alternatively, malnutrition could be 
modeled as having an adverse effect on labor productivity—a well-documented 
fact in micro studies (see Broca and Stamoulis (2003)). Estimating these 
relationships could be difficult at the country level, but using cross-section   30
regressions (as was done here) could help to alleviate problems of degrees of 
freedom. 
 
Our contention, however, is that even in its present form the approach 
proposed in this paper does provide policymakers in Sub-Saharan Africa with a 
unique operational framework to quantify the impact of some key policy choices 
on their ability to achieve the MDGs. Many observers agree that a fundamental 
policy issue for many low-income countries is the allocation of public 
investment—an issue that lies at the heart of our approach.  
 
From a practical standpoint, our approach also has considerable appeal. 
We know full well how to make more complicated models, with multiple sectors 
and households, while at the same time capturing also the dynamics of public 
investment, segmented labor markets, credit market imperfections, and many 
other important features that matter for growth and employment. A prominent 
class of models in that category is IMMPA, which has been applied to a number 
of middle-income countries, including Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Morocco, Tunisia, 
and Turkey (see Agénor, Izquierdo, and Jensen (2005)). However, in a low-
income environment where data are limited and human capital scarce, building 
complex models may simply not be feasible. The macro model that lies at the 
core of our approach was built in about 6 to 8 months for two countries (Ethiopia 
and Niger) for which data are comparable in quality and availability to other LICs 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using the cross-country regressions presented in this 
paper, our approach should be therefore relatively easy to replicate for a number 
of other countries in the region. Doing so would enable these countries to 
strengthen the analytical basis for designing their PRSP and improve the quality 
of the policy debate—particularly regarding the likely effects of increased aid and 
the level of assistance needed to meet the MDGs. 
 
Our approach also brings to the fore the limitations of the current concept 
of “Poverty Reduction” Strategy Papers.  The implicit focus on poverty in this   31
approach is too narrow, and does not account for the fact that other social 
indicators may be equally important in assessing the implications of a particular 
development strategy. The fact that such indicators may be correlated with 
poverty does not imply that reducing the incidence of poverty will necessarily 
lead to improvements in those dimensions as well; targeted policy measures may 
be essential. A more encompassing term than PRSP, emphasizing the different 
dimensions of human development, would redress any sense of imbalance in 
policy objectives and strategies to attain them. Our proposed term is Strategy 
Papers for Human Development, or SPAHD. This is more, in our view, than 
simply a matter of semantics. It would help to provide a constant reminder to all 
parties involved that although it is increasingly clear that many low-income 
countries are unlikely to attain the MDGs by the target date of 2015, the 
objectives set forth in the Millennium Declaration should remain a focal point of 
the development agenda for years to come. 
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Appendix 
Data and Cross-Section Regressions 
 
As described in the text, the focus of our macroeconomic approach is on 
six of the MDG indicators. Because the model can directly calculate values for 
the poverty and the literacy rates, we only ran regressions to estimate the 
equations for infant mortality, malnutrition, life expectancy, and access to safe 
water. The estimation method is ordinary least squares. We use cross-section 
data, obtained by taking average values of variables for each country for the 
period 1965-2003, depending on the availability of data series. Our sample 
consists of Sub-Saharan countries. This Appendix provides more detail about the 
data and the regressions. 
 
The main data source of the regressions is World Development Indicators 
and World Bank African Database (unless otherwise specified). The following 
Sub-Saharan African countries are included in the sample
19: Angola, Benin, 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
20 The time period is 
1965 and 2003, depending on data availability.  
 
Due to insufficient number of data points for sub-Saharan countries, all 
developing countries are included in the improved water source regressions, 
depending on data availability. The list of countries included in the “improved” 
water source regressions is: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, 
Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Vanuatu, and Yemen. 
 
The list of variables and their definitions are as follows: 
 
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5): 
Prevalence of child malnutrition (weight for age) is the percentage of children 
under five whose weight for age is more than two standard deviations below the 
median reference standard for their age as established by the World Health 
Organization, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the U.S. 
                                                 
19 The number of countries included in each regression changes, depending on data availability. 
20 The regression results are robust to excluding oil exporting countries and South Africa. The 
results obtained using this smaller dataset are presented in Table A2.   36
National Center for Health Statistics. Figures are based on children under age 
three, four, and five years of age, depending on the country. 
 
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births): Infant mortality rate is the 
number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in 
a given year. 
 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years): Life expectancy at birth indicates 
the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality 
at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. 
 
Improved water source (% of population with access): Access to an 
improved water source refers to the percentage of the population with reasonable 
access to an adequate amount of water from an improved source, such as a 
household connection, public standpipe, borehole, protected well or spring, and 
rainwater collection. Unimproved sources include vendors, tanker trucks, and 
unprotected wells and springs. Reasonable access is defined as the availability 
of at least 20 liters a person a day from a source within one kilometer of the 
dwelling. 
 
Public health expenditure in % of GDP: Public health expenditure 
consists of recurrent and capital spending from government (central and local) 
budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from international 
agencies and nongovernmental organizations), and social (or compulsory) health 
insurance funds. 
 
Public infrastructure expenditure in percent of GDP: Public 
infrastructure expenditure consists of energy, transportation, and communication. 
The data source is Government Financial Statistics. 
 
Final private consumption expenditure in per capita terms (in 
constant 2003 U.S. dollars): Household final consumption expenditure (private 
consumption) is the market value of all goods and services, including durable 
products (such as cars, washing machines, and home computers), purchased by 
households. It excludes purchases of dwellings but includes imputed rent for 
owner-occupied dwellings. It also includes payments and fees to governments to 
obtain permits and licenses. Here, household consumption expenditure includes 
the expenditures of nonprofit institutions serving households, even when reported 
separately by the country.  
 
GDP in per capita terms (in constant 2003 U.S. dollars): GDP is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. 
It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
   37
Population density (people per sq km): Population density is midyear 
population divided by land area in square kilometers. Population is based on the 
de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal 
status or citizenship--except for refugees not permanently settled in the country 
of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of 
origin. Land area is a country’s total area, excluding area under inland water 
bodies, national claims to continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones. In 
most cases the definition of inland water bodies includes major rivers and lakes. 
 
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population):  
National poverty rate is the percentage of the population living below the national 
poverty line. National estimates are based on population-weighted sub-group 
estimates from household surveys. 
 
Estimation results are shown in Tables A1 to A2. 
 
We explain the malnutrition prevalence rate by public health expenditure in 
percent of GDP, real private consumption per capita, and poverty. The estimated 
coefficients of the first two variables have a negative sign and are statistically 
significant. This indicates that both public health expenditure and private 
consumption reduce the malnutrition prevalence rate. The coefficient of poverty 
is positive, which indicates that as poverty decreases, malnutrition prevalence 
falls as well. 
 
Infant mortality is explained by public health expenditure, GDP per capita, 
and poverty. The estimated coefficients of public health expenditure and GDP 
per capita have a negative sign, which indicates that as they increase, infant 
mortality drops. The coefficient of poverty is positive and statistically significant. 
This indicates that as poverty drops, infant mortality decreases as well. 
 
Life expectancy is explained by public health expenditure, GDP per capita, 
and poverty. The results indicate that both health expenditure and GDP per 
capita increase life expectancy. On the other hand, the coefficient of poverty is 
highly significant and negative, as expected. As poverty drops, life expectancy at 
birth increases. 
 
The share of population with access to safe water is taken to be a function 
of population density, GDP per capita, and public infrastructure expenditure per 
capita. The sign of population density is positive as expected since the average 
cost of building infrastructure capital may drop with higher density; thus, the 
share of population with access to safe water increases. The coefficient of GDP 
per capita is positive as well. An increase in public infrastructure expenditure per 
capita leads to a rise in the share of population with access to safe water 
increases. 
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Table A1 
Cross-Section Regression Results 
(All sub-Saharan countries are included unless otherwise indicated) 
 
  Dependent variables 
  MALNUTRITION ln(MORTALITY) ln(LIFE_EXP)  WATER  2/ 















ln(CPPC2003$)  -7.951 
(-4.126) 
… … … 













INF_GDP  … … … 1.702 
(1.718) 
ln(POP_DENSITY)  …  …  …  4.076 
(1.551) 
      
      
Number of 
observations 
28 31 20 31 
Adjusted R
2  0.552 0.479 0.739 0.292 
      
 
  Note: The estimation technique is OLS. Data points of independent variables in each country 
correspond exactly to the years in which dependent variables are available. First, averages at the 
country level are calculated, then the regression equations are run using these cross sectional data. t-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. MALNUTRITION is malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% 
of children under 5); HEA_P_GDP is public health expenditure in % of GDP; CPPC2003$ is private 
consumption per capita (in constant 2003 dollars); POVERTY is the percent of population living under 
$2 per day; MORTALITY is infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births); GDPPC2003$ is GDP per 
capita (in constant 2003 dollars); LIFE_EXP is life expectancy at birth, total, years; INF_GDP is public 
infrastructure expenditure in percent of GDP; WATER is percentage of population with access to safe 
water; POPDEN is population density (people per km square).  
 1 / While the data source of public heath expenditure is Government Financial Statistics in the life-
expectancy regression, the data source of public heath expenditure is World Bank African Database 
in other regressions. 
  2/ Due to insufficient number of data points for sub-Saharan African countries, all developing 
countries are included depending on data availability. 
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Table A2 
Cross-Section Regression Results 
(Oil-exporting countries and South Africa are excluded) 
 
  Dependent variables 
  MALNUTRITION ln(MORTALITY)  ln(LIFE_EXP) 












ln(CPPC2003$)  -7.078 
(-3.789) 
… … 










     
     
Number of 
observations 
26 29 19 
Adjusted R
2  0.605 0.474 0.736 
     
 
  Note: The estimation technique is OLS. Data points of independent variables in each country 
correspond exactly to the years in which dependent variables are available. First, averages at the 
country level are calculated, then the regression equations are run using these cross sectional data. t-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. MALNUTRITION is malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% 
of children under 5); HEA_P_GDP is public health expenditure in % of GDP; CPPC2003$ is private 
consumption per capita (in constant 2003 dollars); POVERTY is the percent of population living under 
$2 per day; MORTALITY is infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births); GDPPC2003$ is GDP per 
capita (in constant 2003 dollars); LIFE_EXP is life expectancy at birth, total, years.  
 1 / While the data source of public heath expenditure is Government Financial Statistics in the life-
expectancy regression, the data source of public heath expenditure is World Bank African Database 
in other regressions. 
 1990 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Poverty rate (2003 = 63)
(% of the population living below $2 per day) 63.0 1/
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -0.5 64.3 63.5 62.4 61.1 59.8 58.5 57.3 56.1 55.1 54.2 53.4
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.0 65.6 64.0 61.8 59.2 56.7 54.2 51.9 49.9 48.1 46.5 45.1
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.5 66.9 64.5 61.1 57.3 53.6 50.1 46.9 44.1 41.7 39.7 37.9
   Ravallion's (2004) adjusted elasticity (Gini = 50.5) 65.9 64.2 61.6 58.8 55.8 53.1 50.6 48.3 46.3 44.6 43.1
Literacy rate 11.4 19.2 19.9 20.8 21.7 22.6 23.5 24.4 25.3 26.1 26.9 27.6
(% of educated labor in total population)
Infant mortality (2002=155) 191 156 153 149 144 139 135 131 127 124 121 119
(Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births)
Malnutrition (2000=40.1) 42.6 2/ 41.1 41.1 40.7 40.2 39.6 39.1 38.5 38.0 37.6 37.2 36.8
(Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age)
Life expectancy (2002 = 46.2) 42.1 46.5 46.5 46.8 47.1 47.5 47.8 48.1 48.4 48.6 48.9 49.1
(Life expectancy at birth, years )
Access to safe water (2000=59) 53.0 57.5 57.9 58.3 58.7 59.1 59.6 60.0 60.3 60.7 61.1 61.4
(Percentage of population with access to safe water)
COMPOSITE MDG INDICATOR (2005 = 100) 100.0 101.4 103.7 106.2 108.9 111.5 114.1 116.6 118.9 121.0 123.0
(A rise denotes an improvement)
Aid and external debt indicators
   Foreign aid (in % of GDP) 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7
   Aid (in % of total government revenue) 51.4 51.4 51.3 51.3 51.2 51.2 51.1 51.0 50.9 50.8 50.8
   External debt (in % of GDP) 62.0 59.4 56.4 53.3 50.5 48.1 46.0 44.2 42.7 41.4 40.4
   Interest payments on external public debt (in % of GDP) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
   Interest payments on external public debt (in % of exports) 3.6 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3
Note: The “adjusted” elasticity formula proposed by Ravallion (2004) is -9.3*(1-Gini)^3 = -1.13 where Gini index is 50.5 for Niger. 
Malnutrition prevalence is in % of children under 5.
1/ The observation year is 1993.
2/ The observation year is 1992. 
Projections
Table 2
Niger: MDG Indicators, Baseline Results for 2005-152006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Poverty rate (2003 = 63)
(% of the population living below $2 per day)
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -0.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -1.1 -1.2
   Ravallion's (2004) adjusted elasticity (Gini = 50.5) -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0
Literacy rate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5
(% of educated labor in total population)
Infant mortality (2002=155) -2 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2
(Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births)
Malnutrition (2000=40.1) -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
(Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age)
Life expectancy (2002 = 46.2) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
(Life expectancy at birth, years )
Access to safe water (2000=59) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
(Percentage of population with access to safe water)
COMPOSITE MDG INDICATOR 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.6
(A rise denotes an improvement)
Aid and external debt indicators
   Foreign aid (in % of GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Aid (in % of total government revenue) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
   External debt (in % of GDP) -49.8 -44.5 -39.5 -35.2 -31.5 -28.3 -25.7 -23.4 -21.5 -19.8
   Interest payments on external public debt (in % of GDP) -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
   Interest payments on external public debt (in % of exports) -3.4 -3.0 -2.7 -2.4 -2.2 -2.0 -1.8 -1.6 -1.5 -1.4
Projections
Table 4
Niger: External Debt Cancellation in 2006, Simulation Results for 2006-15
(Absolute deviations from baseline)2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Poverty rate (2003 = 63)
(% of the population living below $2 per day)
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -0.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -1.1 -1.2
   Ravallion's (2004) adjusted elasticity (Gini = 50.5) -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0
Literacy rate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5
(% of educated labor in total population)
Infant mortality (2002=155) -2 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2
(Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births)
Malnutrition (2000=40.1) -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
(Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age)
Life expectancy (2002 = 46.2) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
(Life expectancy at birth, years )
Access to safe water (2000=59) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
(Percentage of population with access to safe water)
COMPOSITE MDG INDICATOR 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.6
(A rise denotes an improvement)
Aid and external debt indicators
   Foreign aid (in % of GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Aid (in % of total government revenue) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
   External debt (in % of GDP) -49.8 -44.5 -39.5 -35.2 -31.5 -28.3 -25.7 -23.4 -21.5 -19.8
   Interest payments on external public debt (in % of GDP) -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
   Interest payments on external public debt (in % of exports) -3.4 -3.0 -2.7 -2.4 -2.2 -2.0 -1.8 -1.6 -1.5 -1.4
Projections
Table 4
Niger: External Debt Cancellation in 2006, Simulation Results for 2006-15
(Absolute deviations from baseline)1990 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Poverty rate (2003 = 63)
(% of the population living below $2 per day) 63.0 1/
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -0.5 64.3 63.7 62.9 62.0 61.1 60.4 59.6 59.0 58.4 57.9 57.5
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.0 65.6 64.3 62.7 61.0 59.3 57.7 56.4 55.1 54.1 53.2 52.4
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.5 66.9 65.0 62.5 59.9 57.4 55.1 53.2 51.5 50.0 48.7 47.7
   Ravallion's (2004) adjusted elasticity (Gini = 50.5) 65.9 64.5 62.7 60.7 58.8 57.1 55.5 54.2 53.0 52.0 51.2
Literacy rate 11.4 19.2 19.8 20.4 21.0 21.5 22.0 22.5 22.9 23.3 23.6 23.9
(% of educated labor in total population)
Infant mortality (2002=155) 191 156 154 151 147 144 141 139 137 135 133 132
(Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births)
Malnutrition (2000=40.1) 42.6 2/ 41.1 41.2 40.9 40.5 40.2 39.8 39.5 39.3 39.0 38.8 38.7
(Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age)
Life expectancy (2002 = 46.2) 42.1 46.5 46.5 46.7 46.9 47.1 47.3 47.5 47.6 47.8 47.9 48.0
(Life expectancy at birth, years )
Access to safe water (2000=59) 53.0 57.5 57.8 58.1 58.5 58.8 59.1 59.4 59.6 59.9 60.1 60.3
(Percentage of population with access to safe water)
COMPOSITE MDG INDICATOR (2005 = 100) 100.0 101.1 102.7 104.4 106.1 107.6 109.0 110.3 111.5 112.5 113.4
(A rise denotes an improvement)
Aid and external debt indicators
   Foreign aid (in % of GDP) 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7
   Aid (in % of total government revenue) 51.4 51.3 51.1 51.0 50.9 50.7 50.6 50.6 50.5 50.5 50.4
   External debt (in % of GDP) 62.2 60.1 57.8 55.6 53.5 51.8 50.2 48.9 47.8 46.7 45.8
   Interest payments on external public debt (in % of GDP) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
   Interest payments on external public debt (in % of exports) 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6
Note: The “adjusted” elasticity formula proposed by Ravallion (2004) is -9.3*(1-Gini)^3 = -1.13 where Gini index is 50.5 for Niger. 
Malnutrition prevalence is in % of children under 5.
1/ The observation year is 1993.
2/ The observation year is 1992. 
Projections
Table 5
Niger: MDG Indicators, Baseline Results for 2005-15, Lower Efficiency of Public Investment2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Poverty rate (2003 = 63)
(% of the population living below $2 per day)
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -1.1 -1.4 -1.8 -2.2 -2.6 -3.0 -3.3
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.0 -0.6 -1.0 -1.5 -2.1 -2.7 -3.4 -4.1 -4.7 -5.4 -6.0
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.5 -0.9 -1.6 -2.3 -3.1 -3.9 -4.8 -5.7 -6.5 -7.3 -8.0
   Ravallion's (2004) adjusted elasticity (Gini = 50.5) -0.7 -1.2 -1.7 -2.4 -3.1 -3.8 -4.5 -5.2 -5.9 -6.6
Literacy rate 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.6 2.0
(% of educated labor in total population)
Infant mortality (2002=155) -10 -10 -11 -11 -12 -13 -14 -15 -16 -17
(Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births)
Malnutrition (2000=40.1) -3.0 -2.8 -2.9 -3.0 -3.2 -3.3 -3.5 -3.7 -3.9 -4.1
(Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age)
Life expectancy (2002 = 46.2) 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2
(Life expectancy at birth, years )
Access to safe water (2000=59) 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9
(Percentage of population with access to safe water)
COMPOSITE MDG INDICATOR 3.3 3.4 3.9 4.5 5.3 6.1 7.1 8.0 9.0 10.0
(A rise denotes an improvement)
Aid and external debt indicators
   Foreign aid (in % of GDP) 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
   Aid (in % of total government revenue) 10.6 10.8 10.9 11.1 11.2 11.2 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3
   External debt (in % of GDP) -5.7 -8.0 -10.2 -12.1 -13.8 -15.3 -16.6 -17.8 -18.9 -19.9
   Interest payments on external public debt (in % of GDP) 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
   Interest payments on external public debt (in % of exports) 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8
Projections
Table 6
Niger: 5 Percentage Point Increase in Aid-to-GDP Ratio, Simulation Results for 2006-15, Lower Efficiency of Public Investment
(Absolute deviations from baseline)2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Poverty rate (2003 = 63)
(% of the population living below $2 per day)
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -0.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0
   Ravallion's (2004) adjusted elasticity (Gini = 50.5) -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8
Literacy rate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
(% of educated labor in total population)
Infant mortality (2002=155) -2 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2
(Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births)
Malnutrition (2000=40.1) -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
(Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age)
Life expectancy (2002 = 46.2) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
(Life expectancy at birth, years )
Access to safe water (2000=59) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
(Percentage of population with access to safe water)
COMPOSITE MDG INDICATOR 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1
(A rise denotes an improvement)
Aid and external debt indicators
   Foreign aid (in % of GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Aid (in % of total government revenue) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
   External debt (in % of GDP) -50.6 -45.9 -41.7 -38.1 -34.9 -32.2 -29.9 -27.8 -26.0 -24.4
   Interest payments on external public debt (in % of GDP) -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
   Interest payments on external public debt (in % of exports) -3.4 -3.1 -2.8 -2.6 -2.4 -2.2 -2.0 -1.9 -1.7 -1.6
Projections
Table 7
Niger: External Debt Cancellation in 2006, Simulation Results for 2006-15, Lower Efficiency of Public Investment
(Absolute deviations from baseline)